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Abstract 
This paper addresses the issue of international payments in a stock-flow framework, by 
capturing the interaction between the current account balance and international assets 
portfolios of domestic and foreign investors. It is argued that the stability of such interaction 
may be affected by shifts in the preferences of investors, by the relative rate of return of 
different assets, and—more in general—by institutional settings. The model is then used for 
policy analysis purposes to derive the conditions for the existence of dynamic equilibria, and 
if they can be attained, under the assumption of market-distorting policy choices.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The long debate on the sustainability of current account imbalances has revived in 
recent years following the world financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the accumulation of 
large foreign exchange stocks by the main surplus countries. Indeed in recent years, a 
problem that seemed fully manageable and was even viewed as a new feature of the 
international monetary system has become a compelling issue
1. The answer to such a 
problem cannot but  involve a cooperative response by all actors involved.  For this 
reason, at their September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit the Group of Twenty (G-20) Leaders 
launched their “Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth”. The thrust of 
this approach is that, under a mutual assessment process, G-20 economies would adopt 
the policies aimed at the achievement of their final targets in a mutually coherent 
framework, to avoid negative spillovers and mutual inconsistencies among national 
goals. The coordination process has proceeded from there. In their Meeting in Paris last 
February, the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed on a set of 
indicators focused “on those persistently large imbalances which require policy actions”. 
The idea of having indicators as a guide to the implementation of economic policy in a 
world of large open economies has many precedents in economic  literature. Most 
valuably it can be viewed as a way to overcome frictions and disputes that arise from 
different evaluations of the relationship between targets and instruments
2
A coordination process based on agreed values of the final targets, however, still 
requires these values to be such as to reconcile domestic views in a multicounty 
framework, and also to be economically viable. The latter requirement involves 
considering a set of end target values to be pursued for the purposes of creating 
medium-  and long-run stability. The key here is the link between stocks and flows. 
Economic literature has long discussed the interaction between flows and stocks—their 
development is viewed as particularly relevant in a number of problems ranging from 
public finance to international payments
. 
3
It is to the latter problem that the present paper is addressed, with the aim of capturing 
the interactions between current account balances and the international asset portfolios 
of domestic and foreign investors in a stock-flow framework. It is argued that the stability 
of such interaction may be affected by shifts in the preferences of investors, by the 
relative rate of return of different assets, and—more generally—by institutional settings. 
The model is then used for policy analysis purposes to derive the conditions for the 
existence of dynamic equilibria, and if they can be attained, under alternative market-
distorting policy choices.    
.  
                                                 
1 For a survey of the problem and its possible solutions see Martinez Oliva (2011). 
2 See Cooper (1987). 
3 In particular, the connection between current account balances and the net external position of a country 
lends support to the idea that global imbalances should be closely monitored. For a review of the 
traditional benchmarks for assessing the level of risk when the stock of external debt is excessive see 
Cline (2005). ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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2.  A MODEL OF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT AND 
PORTFOLIO BALANCES 
To understand the implications of global imbalances for equilibrium in the world 
economy, and the potential for different policy regimes to prolong them or to exaggerate 
them, we need to construct a model of current account balances, internationally held 
asset balances and  the interactions between the two. After all, global imbalances in 
trade or current accounts cannot be sustained without accumulating matching 
imbalances in asset holdings (net assets, or net liabilities) to support them.  
A model of the interactions between current account balances and (international) 
portfolio balances will allow us to capture the capacity of the former to generate sufficient 
funds to supply the net interest payments that need to be paid on the latter; and, where 
necessary, to repay the net liabilities, if only in the form of refinancing. Modeling these 
interactions is necessary because equilibrium, with or without imbalances, is going to 
require what Max Corden (2011) calls “the return journey” to be covered. 
To the extent that a country has insufficient capacity to make those payments, or that 
there is a shift in the trade balance or a change in preferences for domestic or foreign 
assets, then there has to be some adjustment in exchange rates or rates of return, or in 
the underlying trade balance and asset positions, until equilibrium is re-established—
assuming of course that these adjustments form a stable process and that an equilibrium 
state exists. 
Since current accounts and portfolio balances both affect exchange rates and rates of 
return, and hence each other indirectly, it is obvious they need to be modeled jointly. 
Normally this is done implicitly, by assuming perfectly substitutable assets between 
countries, and instantaneous but complete market adjustments, so that uncovered 
interest rate parity can be applied. However, given that we are dealing with a problem 
where current account imbalances or a country’s net debt may have to be limited, it is far 
from obvious that such a model is appropriate for a world of global imbalances and 
possible market distortions caused by sticky prices, fixed exchange rates, capital 
controls, and a revealed preference for holding foreign reserves or foreign assets.  
A more general approach, with interest parity as a special case, is provided by 
Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005), who model current account and portfolio balances 
directly, and the adjustment processes between them. This model allows us to consider 
imperfect asset substitutability, and hence different asset preferences. It also allows us 
to examine the stability of the adjustment process in asset holdings which follows from a 
change in (or imposed limit on) trade balances. It is based on earlier models developed 
by Masson (1981), Henderson and Rogoff (1983), and most obviously Kouri (1983), but 
extended to show the gross asset positions of different countries, and the valuation 
effects caused by financial flows between them.
4
To set a model of this kind up, we proceed in four steps: 
 We adapt this model to analyze a 
particular problem, the wider implications of imposing limits to exchange rate movements 
or capital movements for imbalances in trade and a country’s external debt. 
                                                 
4 Effects stressed in Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004), and  Obstfeld 
(2004). ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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2.1  Perfect Asset Substitutability 
For simplicity of explanation, consider two countries: home and foreign. In each country, 
the foreign sector is determined by two relationships. First uncovered interest parity, 
                                       1 (1 ) (1 *) /
e r rEE + +=+                                                     (1) 
where  r  and  r*  are the home and foreign rates of interest respectively (“*” denotes 
foreign variables throughout); E is the real exchange rate (defined as the price of home 
goods relative to foreign goods), and  1
e E+ is the real exchange rate expected next period. 
Thus                               /( *) E P eP =                                                                  (2) 
where e is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the units of domestic currency needed 
to purchase one unit of foreign currency: dollars per euro say, if the US is the home 
country. Thus a fall in e, and hence a rise in E, indicates a strengthening domestic 
currency other things equal: an appreciation of the dollar, say. The interest rate parity 
condition states that the expected returns on home and foreign assets must always be 
equal, and assumes that markets clear instantly and that there are no preferences: 
hence perfectly substitute-able assets. 
Second, net foreign liabilities (or debt) accumulated by the home country: 
                                        1 11 (1 ) ( , ) F rF DE z + ++ = ++                                          (3) 
where F is net foreign debt or liabilities of the home country denominated in the home 
currency (the amount of domestic currency needed to pay them off). D(E,z) is the trade 
deficit, defined to be an increasing function of the real exchange rate. Thus D>0 implies 
a deficit, and an appreciating currency or real exchange rate will make that deficit larger 
(the first derivative is positive, 0 E D > ). Conversely, D <0 denotes a trade surplus and a 
depreciating currency or real exchange rate will make it larger (more negative). Equation 
(3) says that net liabilities next period are equal to net foreign debt this period, plus net 
interest payments due, plus the current trade deficit. Thus, by analogy to the government 
budget constraint in fiscal policy, D plays the role of primary deficit and rF the interest 
payments on past debt – although the government cannot just set D in the way it does 
the primary deficit. It also implies that the current account, CA = D – rF, plays the same 
role as gross fiscal debt. 
Finally,  z  is a shift variable describing the impact of a trade shock, a change in 
preference for home goods, or other changes in spending or the pattern of spending on 
those goods. It is defined so that increase in z worsens the trade balance: 0. z D >  
2.2  Imperfect substitutability and portfolio balances 
To allow for imperfect substitutability between (national) assets, let W be the total wealth 
of home investors, X denote the total stock of home’s assets and F the net debt position 
of the home economy (all in real terms). Thus: 
                                           WXF = −      where   . XF ≥                                    (4) 
The corresponding expression for the wealth of foreign investors, in home’s currency, is 
                                            */ */ . W EX EF = +                                                (5) ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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So the expected real rate of return from holding home’s assets relative to foreign assets, 
is 
                                            1 [(1 )/(1 *)]. /
ee R r rEE + = ++                                    (6) 
Perfect substitutability between assets with instantaneous market clearing is therefore 
just a special case with  1
e R = since r = r* and  1 .
e EE + =  Home investors will distribute 
their wealth between home and foreign assets, putting a share α in home securities and 
1-α in foreign assets (likewise α* and 1-α* are the shares of foreign’s wealth held in 
domestic and external assets). It is reasonable to assume that α is increasing in the 
relative rate of return on home assets,
e R ; and in s, defined as the preference for holding 
home’s assets (including home bias, and any safe haven effects) or any other shift 
factors that increase the demand for home’s assets. Symmetrically, α* is decreasing in 
those two factors. If home biases dominate the asset market, then  * 1. αα +> But 
whether they do or not is left open: it is not an condition that we impose in this paper. 
Equilibium in the market for home’s assets, and hence foreign’s assets, is then given by 
                     (1 *) * / ( ) (1 *)( * / ) X W W E XF X EF αα α α = +− = − +− +            (7) 
where α and α* may vary with 
e R  and s as stated. This is the portfolio balance equation. 
Unlike the perfect substitutability case, the distribution of wealth holdings between home 
and foreign is independent of shifts in the trade or current account balances (ie z). 
Instead the exchange rate E (and relative rates of return
e R and asset preferences s, 
which affect α) determines and is determined by the world distribution of wealth holdings. 
Nevertheless, trade and current account balances do lead to changes in F, and hence to 
changes in the exchange rate. This we represent by the slope of the portfolio balance 
relationship: 
                                       2
*1
0








   iff    * 1. αα +>                    (8)
5
Notice that: (i) the portfolio balance relation is by definition nonlinear in E-F space, and 
will be downward sloping as long as some home biases persist
 
*1 αα +> ; (ii) under 
these conditions higher net debt at home requires a lower exchange rate (because the 
demand for home assets has fallen); (iii) portfolio balances in fact imply a relation 
between net debt, the exchange rate and future expected exchange rates (through α 
and
e R ); (iv) the exchange rate will respond rather little to current account or trade 
imbalances, but rather more to changes in portfolio preferences and the distribution of 
wealth holdings. 
2.3  Current account balances under imperfect substitutability 
If home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, and the trade balance D behaves 
as in (3), then home net debt in the next period will be: 
                 1 1 11 (1 *)(1 ) * / (1 )(1 *) . / ( , )
e F rW E r WE E DE z αα + + ++ ∆ =− + −− + +           (9) 
                                                 
5 Both (8) and (11) below are derived assuming that variations in α and α* are small and may be ignored. This 
is correct up to a local first order approximation, for the reasons that are set out in section 3.1 below. 
Moreover α+α*>1 is a natural condition given transaction costs and foreign risks, and given α,α*=½ implies 
indifference between X and X* as assets. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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That is foreign ownership of home assets (plus interest)
6
                           
, less the value of home owned 
foreign assets (plus interest), plus the next trade deficit. Rewriting with (4), (5) and (6): 
11 (1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 1/ )( )
e F rF r R X F D α ++ =+ +− + − − +                       (10) 
which is the current account balance equation: since  11. CA D rF ++ = −  Notice that the 
term in the middle reflects the changing evaluation effects for home owned foreign 
assets (depending on relative rates of return and expected exchange rate movements). 
Notice also that (10) contains not only the current account balance, but also the 
cumulative effect of “discretionary” trade balance choices—analogous to the primary 
deficit in the budget constraint, although policymakers often have little direct influence 
over  D. However, in a different policy setting, policymakers may affect D  via import 
controls or exchange rate manipulation. As a specific form of the latter, a government 
may decide to hold (invest) its excess foreign currency in the form of reserves—either 
held directly, or as sterilized domestic currency bonds. This, as we shall show, plays a 
particular role in the specific policy regimes highlighted in this paper and amounts to a 
form of currency intervention aimed at creating comparative advantage and a trade 
surplus for the recipient. 
Similarly, policymakers may affect F directly via capital controls: holding F constant if 
those controls are complete, or (more likely) restricting its movement if they are partial. 
The slope of this current account balance relation in E-F space, in the current period, is: 
                             
1 0
(1 )(1 *)( )
dE E




                                                    (11) 
where this time the slope, rather than sign, depends on the size of the domestic asset 
base: a large asset base, X > F, means a shallow slope, a small asset base a steep 
slope to the current account balance line. This is the normal state of affairs since, if F 
rises, it requires E to fall to create a move towards a trade surplus in home to generate 
sufficient extra revenues to pay for the higher net debt—the more so, the smaller is the 
asset base relative to the foreign ownership of domestic assets, but less so the larger 
are home assets relative to foreign owned home assets. That implies (11) will have to be 
negative.  
This completes our revision of the Blanchard-Giavazzi-Sa model. 
3.  CURRENT ACCOUNT AND PORTFOLIO 
ADJUSTMENTS: STABILITY AND DYNAMICS 
Now we develop a more general version of the model. We examine potential equilibria in 
the trade and financial sectors for our two economies, together with the dynamics of the 
adjustment process toward, or away from, those possible equilibria. Do they represent 
stable steady states? 
In this section, we will work with local  linearizations about each possible equilibrium 
point. This is for illustration only. These linearizations will be relaxed in section 5 where 
we deal with the general case.  
                                                 
6The foreign share of domestic assets is the share of foreign wealth allocated to home assets plus interest 
paid on home assets, all evaluated in home currency. Similarly, with roles reversed, for the second term. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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3.1  Critical values where net foreign liabilities rise: the primary 
fiscal surplus analogy 
For the purposes of illustration, we make a further simplifying assumption: any variations 
in α and α* with respect to s or
e R are small and can be ignored. Since α and α* are 
themselves small, this is a reasonable starting point. It would be guaranteed if national 
interest rates were approximately equal and the exchange rate is not expected to adjust 
much (r ≈ r* and  1 ,
e EE + ≈ so 1
e R ≈ ), implying there is little reason to expect any changes 
in asset preferences or the home biases s. These assumptions are for convenience and 
temporary; they will be relaxed below and in section 5. 
Given these simplifications, the portfolio balance equation is, from (9), 
                                       ( ) (1 *)( * / ) X XF X EF αα = − +− +                             (12) 
from (7). And the current account balance equation is a simplified version of (3): in this 
case, since current account balance would imply  1 FF + = , 
                                                  0 (,) rF D E z = +                                                   (13) 
where the approximation  (,) DEz E z θ = + , θ > 0, could be inserted on the right. Both 
equations imply a negative relation between net debt and the exchange rate because of 
the need for the home currency to depreciate to generate more of a surplus to service 
net debt if net debt increases. 
How does net debt change in this world? Eliminating F between (12) and (13), we see 
that net debt does not increase (because the current account remains balanced) if 
                                   (1 *) / (1 *) * / (1 ) D r XE X αα α α −− =− −− ; 
i.e., if                           {(1 *) * / (1 ) }/(1 *) Dr X E X α α αα = − −− −−                    (14). 
This defines a critical value for the trade deficit. If  , DD > home’s net debt F will rise [by 
(3)]. But if  , DD <  home’s net debt will fall; and if , DD =  F remains unchanged. This 
provides the counterpart to the condition for public sector debt not to rise: that the 
primary fiscal deficit shall not exceed (growth less interest rates) times the existing debt 
level. 
It is easy to generalize this part of the story to allow interest rates to differ, r ≠ r*, and 
hence exchange rates to move. Inserting those changes in (10), and ignoring all second 
order changes and higher, (13) becomes  (1 )( *)( ) 0 rF r r X F D α +− − − += . The 
critical value of D is now 
              
{(1 *) * / (1 ) } (1 )( *)[(1 ) * / ]
(1 *) (1 *)
r XE X r r XE X
D
α α α αα
αα αα
− −− − − − +
=−
−− −−
   (15) 
instead of (14). The second term is an additional valuation term. The same results apply 
with respect to whether F will be rising, falling, or unchanged, but centered now around a 
new critical value forD. These results are good up to a first order approximation around 
the portfolio balance line (notice we have not used any linearization for D at this point). ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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3.2  Zones of stability and instability 
Having got the building blocks in place, do these economies represent a stable trading 
and financial system? Figure 1 implies that they are stable so long as the portfolio 
balance line has a steeper downward slope than the current account balance line. In that 
case, a stable steady state will be achieved at the intersection of the two. 
To see this, Figure 1 is divided into 8 different zones. For convenience it has been drawn 
with the steady state (intersection) point, where both asset holdings and the current 
account are in balance at the same time, to reflect a Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange 
Rate (FEER) value (which leaves the current account balanced at zero) and F = 0. But 
that is just convenience: the economies may actually achieve equilibrium/steady state at 
other values for E and F—for example at an E value that generates a trade surplus 
sufficient to service home’s net debt exactly. In fact trade will be balanced (D = 0) 
wherever  FF = lies on the current account line, whether it corresponds to a steady 
state on not. In addition, in this conventional case, there is a trade surplus (D < 0) to the 
right of that point on the CA=0 line, but a trade deficit to the left, as a result of the 
exchange depreciation or appreciation. Similarly F  switches from home having net 
foreign assets (F<0) to home having net foreign liabilities (F>0).  
Figure 1: Current Account and Portfolio Imbalances in E-F Space 
Source: Authors. 
The logic here is that, going to the right of that point, F > 0 becomes larger which means 
larger trade surpluses are needed to pay the interest on the larger net debt if the current 
account is to remain balanced. To generate those surpluses E must fall, until the current 
account deficit reaches the current account balance (CA=0) line. Likewise, to the left of ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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that point, F < 0 becomes smaller which means larger deficits are possible with the same 
current account, and E rises to create those deficits. Thus, above the CA=0 line, trade 
deficits are larger (surpluses smaller) than those at points vertically below: whether on 
the  CA=0  line or below it. Conversely, below that line trade deficits are smaller 
(surpluses larger) that at points vertically above, whether on or off the CA=0 line. But on 
the line, since the current account is balanced, there are no changes in home’s net debt 
position:  0. F =  But above the line, CA<0 and 0 F >  ; and below it, CA>0 with 0. F <   
With these facts in mind, we can trace the movements in E and F at different points in 
Figure 1.  
  In zone A, F is negative but D large and positive. So rF+D > 0, implying CA < 0 and 
hence 0 F >  . The explanation is that E is too high, meaning the trade deficit is too 
large to be balanced by the net inflow of investment earnings (F<0 implies home has 
net foreign assets, but they are diminishing in this zone); 
  Zone B has F < 0, but the trade balance is a large surplus (D < 0). So rF+D < 0; CA 
>0 and 0 F <  . The explanation is the reverse of that in zone A; E is low so the trade 
surplus and investment income both add to home’s net foreign assets. 
  Zone F has F < 0; and D < 0 but small. Hence rF+D < 0, CA > 0 and 0 F <  . The 
explanation is the same as for zone B, but home’s foreign assets grow slower. 
  Zone G is the same as zone A (i.e F < 0 but D > 0) except that the trade deficit is 
now smaller, but still large enough to imply CA < 0 and hence 0. F >   
The remaining zones are the mirror image of those four: 
  Zone C is the opposite of zone B: F > 0 and D > 0 is large. Hence rF+D > 0 and CA 
< 0, so 0. F >   The trade deficit is reinforced by a investment income outflow. 
  Zone H is the same; although the trade deficit is smaller, it still reinforces the net 
outflow of investment income. 
  Zone D has F > 0 but D < 0 is large; so rF+D < 0, CA > 0 and  0. F <   
  Zone E has F > 0 and D < 0 smaller, but large enough to imply CA > 0 and 0. F <   
Hence zones A, C, G and H [above CA=0] all have 0 F >  , which means that if we arrive 
at any point in those zones the portfolio balance line will shift to the right (at any given 
exchange rate value). Similarly, zones B, D, E and F [below CA=0] all have 0 F <  , which 
means the portfolio line will move to the left. In other words, the current account balance 
line depicts a set of unstable equilibria in the sense that, once off it, portfolios start to 
adjust and the portfolio balance positions all shift. The portfolio line, by contrast, does 
not show unstable equilibria. Once off it, exchange rates adjust to rebalance both trade 
and the asset distribution. Thus, we arrive at the inequalities, shifts and dynamic 
adjustments displayed in Figure 2.  
This distinction between the natural instability of the current account equilibria on CA=0, 
and their stability on PB=0, is a natural consequence of a stock-flow adjustment process. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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Figure 2: Adjustment Paths for the Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Portfolio 
Balances 
Source: Authors 
3.3  Stability of the adjustment process 
Suppose now that, for some reason, our two economies had arrived at a position in zone 
G of Figure 1 (that is on the upper side between the two balance lines), but there has 
been no change in asset preferences or home biases. This could have happened 
because of a deterioration in home’s real exchange rate (rising costs); or because of a 
change of policy (home runs a fiscal deficit, causing a trade deficit); or because of a shift 
in relative prices or preference for home goods (opening to cheap imports, discovery of 
new technologies). 
How do the economies adjust from here? Home’s trade deficit outweighs her net 
investment earnings (if any). This implies a current account deficit, and hence a 
decrease in home’s foreign assets or an increase in her net debt. In a world of floating 
exchange rates, this leads to two effects: an increase in foreign’s holdings of home’s 
assets as foreign recycles her surplus earnings of home’s currency or stockpiles them in 
her reserves; and to a depreciation of the exchange rate which reduces the trade deficit 
if foreign sells that surplus home currency. The two economies therefore move down the 
saddle path in a south-easterly direction, as indicated in Figure 3, until the equilibrium 
(steady state) point where PB=0 and CA=0 cross is reached.  ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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Figure 3: The Stable Equilibrium 
Source: Authors 
Now we see something that would not normally appear in phase diagrams such as 
these. Stability not only requires movements to the south-east. It must also be that the 
increased interest payments on home’s (now higher) net debt exactly match the 
decreases in her trade deficit to stop the movements. It will happen automatically at the 
intersection point. But to get to that point depends on how the elasticities of the trade 
response match up to the speed of portfolio adjustments. If the exchange rate is sticky, 
or there are attempts to keep it fixed, it may come about through an adjustment path that 
moves more east than south and therefore hits the portfolio balance line before the 
intersection point. This means the early adjustments take place through net debt 
accumulation or redistribution, and the later ones through exchange rate changes 
caused by portfolio adjustments in response to valuation changes as the expected real 
rate of return on home assets falls (see (6), and then (10)). Then, once we reach the 
PB=0 line we slide down it. Of course, it may happen the other way. If the exchange rate 
is flexible and sensitive, the adjustments are mostly south, not east, as foreign dumps its 
surplus foreign currency reserves until the CA=0 line is reached. The trade deficit has 
been reduced enough to balance current interest payments on net debt, but needs to fall 
further to make space for interest payments on the extra debt created since valuation 
changes will have made home’s assets look increasingly attractive. Hence, this time we 
slide down the CA=0 line. But, either way, the adjustment process is stable and depends 
heavily (but not exclusively) on valuation effects. 
We can tell exactly the same story in reverse if we start from a point in zone E, between 
the lines on the lower side in Figure 1. But starting from any other position, stability is not ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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assured. It depends on the exchange rate being more sensitive and flexible than the net 
debt accumulation process: see Figure 2. This cannot be guaranteed for all parameter 
values. But if it is true, then the adjustments will either hit the PB=0 line, if we start from 
above, or the CA=0 line if we start from below, and the adjustments will then move along 
the relevant line as those valuation effects adjust as in the previous paragraph. In all 
other cases, stability will be lost. 
Finally, it is easy to see that if the relative slopes of the PB=0 and CA=0 lines become 
reversed (the CA=0 line is steeper), then stability is also lost. The potential equilibria are 
always unstable in this case. Figure 4, which is derived from the same information as 
Figure 2, shows this directly. 
Figure 4: The Unstable Equilibrium 
Source: Authors 
There is one qualifying remark to make before we go on to specific policy regimes. This 
analysis has all been conducted with local linearizations about one particular equilibrium 
point. In a non-linear world it is possible to have multiple steady states, some stable like 
Figure 3 and some unstable like Figure 4. In section 5 we find that this will in fact be the 
standard outcome (see figures 6 and 7). ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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3.4  Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability 
Thus to ensure stability in both trade and international capital markets, we need the 
slope of the portfolio balance line to exceed that of the current account line. Using (8) 
and (11), this amounts to requiring: 
                                        
2
1 (1 )(1 *)








                           (16) 
It is easy to satisfy (16), and thus guarantee stability in the international markets, if: 
  X >> F. This represents an economy with a large domestic asset base; that is self-
sufficient in investment and funding (most large developed economies).  
  It is much more difficult to satisfy (16) if XF − is small: that is, in an economy 
heavily dependent on foreign investment for funding (typical of developing or early 
emerging economies; F being net foreign liabilities, not net liabilities). 
  If  E  is low, and expected to remain low,  or  X*  is  large  (or  not widely traded or 
convertible on the international markets), or r* is high. This is generally a matter of 
policy stance, as in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for example or Germany 
in the eurozone. 
  If  *1 αα +≈ , i.e., total home biases are not strong (assets are regarded as largely 
substitutable; investors are indifferent to their source), but  * αα is large.
7
It becomes impossible to satisfy this stability condition if both 
  
α and * α fall such that 
* 1; αα +< and very difficult if . XF ≈  This may be the typical case in smaller developed 
economies—particularly those in the eurozone, or those who peg to the euro or dollar, or 
those who need to rely on holding foreign assets for risk sharing and diversification. 
If * 1, αα +< as might be the case in Hungary, the Czech Republic or the Baltics (“catch-
up” economies with respect to the core eurozone), the system will be unstable especially 
when domestic assets are mostly held abroad( ). XF ≈  And it remains unstable, if a little 
less so, when  *1 αα +> and XF > are both small. That is likely in Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland whose assets are more widely held by other eurozone countries than at home 
(because of high returns relative to other euro zone assets). Italy or Spain, whose assets 
are predominantly held at home, may be relatively safe because α* will be large even in 
a diversifying (small α) eurozone; similarly for Japan relative to the US or the PRC. 
          The lessons from this section are therefore: 
1) The adjustment process described in earlier sections is going to work more effectively 
in some bilateral comparisons than others. 
2) Adjustments in the foreign sector become easier if home has a large asset base and 
few foreign liabilities but wishes to diversify; and if foreign has a home bias and high 
rates of return on a smaller asset base. 
3) For policies that increase stability: home must reduce its home bias, reduce its foreign 
debt (run a more balanced trade account) and increase its asset base. Foreign can help 
                                                 
7If  α+α*≈1,  then  αα*≈α(1-α)  is  maximized  at  α=½.  So  both  conditions  imply  that  stability  follows  from 
substitutability. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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by raising r* (allowing the real exchange rate to rise) without raising its home bias, and 
by increasing its asset base.  
4) That said, E has to be free to adjust as much as required. Since E is a real exchange 
rate, this will have strong domestic policy implications for economies with different 
degrees of inflation control or with managed or sticky (inflexible) nominal exchange 
rates. 
4.  FIXED EXCHANGE RATES AND CAPITAL CONTROLS 
Now we come to the two specific policy regimes that have been widely used in the name 
of guaranteeing stability in the foreign exchange and international capital markets: first, 
fixed exchange rates (as in the eurozone economies; de facto between the US and the 
PRC, or for any country that dollarizes, euro-izes or otherwise pegs its currency); and, 
second, the idea that trading economies should restrict, if not completely control, the 
inflow or outflow of foreign capital. This is an old idea, popular in many developed and 
developing countries in the 1950s–1980s, for protecting an economy’s net foreign debt 
position. But it has had a remarkable revival in the emerging and developing economies 
in recent years, as a means to stabilize their net foreign liabilities—without anyone really 
knowing the impact on economic performance, or whether the economies will be shifted 
to a new (and possibly less satisfactory) equilibrium position altogether. For example, 
could these policies have the effect of reducing short term fluctuations at the cost of 
increasing long term fluctuations, so that the change, when it comes, will be larger and 
more severe than it need have been? These are different  questions to those about 
effectiveness or enforcement of the controls, or the increased stability in net foreign 
liabilities achieved. 
Figure 5 shows the implications of imposing regimes such as these. This diagram is 
figure 2 from section 3.2 above with either a fixed exchange rate , E or a fixed net foreign 
liabilities limit . F

 For ease of exposition, we assume that whichever constraint applies is 
binding. In other words, we abstract from issues of effectiveness in implementation and 
enforcement. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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Figure 5: Adjustment with fixed exchange rates and capital controls 
  
Source: Authors 
In terms of outcomes and performance, the implications are as follows: 
1) At a point such as A, in the fixed exchange rate regime, home’s current account is in 
deficit and her net foreign debt is increasing. So the PB=0 line will shift right, and will 
continue to do so for as long as the fixed exchange rate value remains in place without 
depreciations. The process of adjustment is exactly that described in section 3.3, where 
the early stage movements involve adjustments in the net debt/assets position before 
the valuation and exchange rate effects that cause us to slide down the PB=0 line kick 
in. But the difference is that we never quite  get to A’’  because  no  exchange rate 
depreciations are allowed. So the PB=0 line moves out, and the adjustments to F follow 
(horizontally to the right) without ever fully catching up with that line. This regime is not 
sustainable because home’s  foreign  debt  increases without limit. That cannot be 
sustained for ever; default will break the exchange rate peg when the level of debt can 
no longer be serviced. When that happens, the economy will adjust down the PB=0 line 
till we reach C. But the longer the peg is maintained, the further the PB=0 line will have 
shifted, the greater the increase in debt and eventual currency crash. If we wish to avoid 
those  outcomes,  home or foreign  must introduce capital controls to overcome the ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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impossible trinity
8
2) Similarly, at point B, with no fixed exchange rate constraint, home’s current account is 
in deficit and net foreign debt is increasing. Superficially this looks as if it is going to lead 
to an adjustment process like that in figure 3. But it is different; first because we got to 
point B by constraint, not as a result of a jump in E caused by the market expectations of 
agents who foresee adjustments down a saddle path to a new equilibrium at C. Second, 
we  are off the portfolio balance line even at the start—which means investors are 
adjusting their holdings of home’s net debt, F, even before as well as during the 
transition to the new equilibrium. Hence F adjusts further and faster than in figure 3, 
implying that PB=0 moves rapidly to the right.  
; or they must let the exchange rate peg go; or foreign must indulge in 
ever increasing sterilization of foreign currency reserves (unused foreign assets). In 
other words, the ultimate control has to be placed on the capital account, not the current 
account—until we are forced to accept a change in the exchange rate. 
Whether the combination of these two differences will allow us to reach, and start down, 
a saddle path to a new, non-stationary equilibrium depends on timing. That is, on the 
interplay of differences between the faster adjusting debt (hence upward pressure on the 
current account deficit), vs. the slower short run adjustments of the trade component 
(downward pressure on the current account deficit). If the former dominates, as we might 
expect, we will not get back to the 0 CA = constraint—moving instead down a parallel line 
above it, at best
9
On the other hand, if the trade account changes dominate, then we will leave the initial 
current account deficit and start down a conventional saddle path in the usual way. 
, until we get close to the portfolio balance line; assuming of course that 
the slower moving trade adjustments nonetheless allow us to catch up with movements 
in the portfolio balances. Eventually at PB=0, should we ever get there, F will be moving 
slower than the trade balance and it becomes possible to slide down the portfolio 
balance line to the new equilibrium at C. But there is no guarantee that such a catch up 
will be possible: it depends on the precise timing and sizes of the changes, on the 
import/export price elasticities, on Marshall-Lerner conditions vs. evaluation effects, and 
on expected relative rates of return/capital gains in different assets. And  there is no 
expectations jump to start us off. So there can be no guarantee that a new equilibrium 
would be reached. 
Hence, an equilibrium in this regime is certainly possible. But whether we could actually 
reach it from any particular capital outflow/inflow restriction is an empirical matter. If the 
trade balance is sensitive to movements in the exchange rate (i.e., the Marshall-Lerner 
conditions are well satisfied), then the pressure to move down to the current account line 
would be large relative to the changes in debt and we would catch up with the shifts in C. 
However, if that was the case in a flexible (real) exchange rate world, we would almost 
certainly not have had a current account out of balance in the first place: the trade deficit 
would already have improved with a depreciating exchange rate, taking us to a 
legitimate portfolio (net debt) equilibrium—unless the capital control had been placed 
elsewhere for strategic reasons. Moreover the evidence is against such a proposition. 
The Marshall-Lerner conditions are often not satisfied, especially in the short run when 
                                                 
8Or build up sterilized foreign currency reserves (as in the PRC or South East Asia) to preserve an 
independent monetary policy while keeping E fixed. The crucial role of these unused currency reserves is 
emphasized again at point 5) below. 
9If there is a J-curve effect, the trade adjustments will be smaller in the short term than in the long term, and 
the line we move down will have a lesser slope (all periods will contain some new short run adjustments) 
than the CA=0 line. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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the J-curve effect applies. In that case we will stay around the initial current account 
position and capital constraint as the demand for new portfolio balances moves the 
PB=0 line to the right. Reaching a new equilibrium then becomes a matter of timing. In 
the near term, rising interest payments, and the short term insensitivity of the trade 
deficit to exchange rate variations, mean we will move parallel to the current account 
constraint chasing the  PB=0  line. In the longer term, the trade deficit may become 
sensitive enough, and cumulative depreciations large enough, for the economy to 
approach the CA=0 line. If so, E will jump to the saddle path, as in figure 3, because 
there is now a genuine expectation of reaching an equilibrium at C where  0 F =  and the 
PB=0  line stops moving.  However, the danger is that the corrections to the trade 
imbalance may never be large enough, rapid enough, or strong enough, to get us to 
approach the current account balance line and trigger the larger exchange rate 
adjustments needed to overcome the escalating debt. 
3) These are all changes that may lead to an equilibrium in the long run, when the 
capital controls break down, or are finally evaded, or become too expensive to enforce 
properly. And they may lead to an equilibrium in the shorter term too when the capital 
controls are partial, weakly enforced, or are intended to be incomplete.  
Whatever the case, figure 5 shows dual exchange rates will be needed in the short run, 
either explicitly or implicitly, to sustain the capital controls while they are in operation – 
higher for asset transactions, and lower for trade, for a capital outflow limit below the 
current equilibrium value; and vice versa for a capital inflow limit above its current 
equilibrium. Thus, for a capital controls regime to be implementable, we have to be able 
to compute the equilibrium position C explicitly; and to determine the PB=0 and CA=0 
lines numerically to calculate the two dual exchange rate values needed. These are of 
course temporary exchange rate values, and need to be adjusted each period as the 
underlying trade balances and portfolios change. Dual exchange rates have often been 
used in developing countries; and now increasingly in emerging markets with excessive 
capital inflows. The need to adjust the shadow exchange rates correctly and accurately 
is not easily achieved, even when the wedge between them is created through a tax or a 
surcharge, or through quantity restrictions. As a result, the adjustment process often 
gets interrupted, frozen or driven off course, and we never reach the new steady state—
which explains why dual exchange rate systems have typically collapsed so easily in 
practice. 
4) Thus, a regime of capital controls can be sustainable. But it is risky because of the 
danger that debt liabilities build up faster than trade balance improvements; and it can 
only lead to a new steady state if exchange rates are allowed to be sufficiently flexible. 
That would probably rule it out as a regime for restraining the trade imbalances between 
the US and the PRC, or for reducing Germany’s trade imbalances with her euro 
partners; but it could work between the PRC and the eurozone. 
Fixed exchange rate regimes are equally risky for the same reason, and because 
relative prices and costs have to made to move in exactly the right way—see point 7) 
below. 
To better understand how these regimes work, three further observations: 
5) The movements described above apply to any points on the fixed exchange rate line 
between A” and A’, including A” but excluding A’; and to any point on the current account 
constraint  between B  and B’’ (but not B’). This is because at A” and B” the asset 
portfolios are temporarily balanced, but 0 F >  in either case so the portfolio balance line ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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will be moving. This is not a temporary equilibrium. But at A’ for example, we have an 
unstable equilibrium because although D > 0 and F < 0 the trade deficit is matched by 
the revenues from home’s net foreign assets, implying  0. F =   That is an unstable point 
because, to sustain it, your trading partner has to sterilize all further foreign exchange 
earnings,  or hold them  as  reserves,  but  not convert them into assets. If they are 
converted, the exchange rate will fall, and the portfolio balance line shift, the moment a 
shock hits the system;  or  when  the trade deficit changes;  or  when  interest rates or 
relative prices change. In other words that position will not survive shocks or changes 
without  extensive sterilization or  careful management of the currency reserves. The 
same point applies to the unstable equilibrium at B’. In either case, because there will be 
increasing  amounts in unused currency reserves, it is debt management and 
unrestricted reserves  that sustain the regime;  not capital controls or  fixed exchange 
rates. 
6) Ultimately capital controls can only work with flexible real exchange rates. The two 
regimes cannot be combined, unless the capital controls are total and dual exchange 
rates can be enforced. 
7) In practice we cannot actually fix E, unless strict price stability rules are in place at the 
same time, since it represents a real exchange rate, not a nominal one. That is to say, 
inflation control has to produce the same inflation rates in both economies for a fixed 
(nominal) exchange rate regime to work. Similarly, for capital controls to be sustainable, 
they have to be combined with a fixed dual exchange rate regime (if control is total); or 
flexible dual exchange rates coordinated with precisely calibrated changes in relative 
costs and prices (if not). Thus fixed exchange rates are an option within a full currency 
union like the eurozone or the United Kingdom; but not between economies with 
different degrees of inflation control, such as between the PRC and the US or the PRC 
and the eurozone. Similarly, capital controls could work between flexible exchange rate 
economies (the PRC and the EU; but not where exchange rates are de facto fixed (at 
least not without extensive additional agreements on how to adjust relative prices); and 
not within a currency union lacking a precise mechanism—a competitiveness pact?—to 
guarantee that both parties are able to adjust their relative costs exactly as required. 
5.  THE COMPLETE SYSTEM: MEASURES OF “TRADE 
SPACE” 
The last step is to recreate the general problem, but without imposing any linearizations 
that restrict us to analyzing only certain parts of it. However, rather than assuming a 
specific functional form for the trade deficit term D, which would inevitably introduce 
additional arbitrariness to a problem where slopes (hence precise functional forms) 
matter, we work with implicit functions. We start from expressions for the slopes of the 
portfolio and current account equations already obtained.  They enable us to give a 
global representation for those two relationships, even if the numerical evaluations we 
use are a series of state dependent approximations to the underlying generic functions. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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We start with the portfolio balance equation with imperfectly substitutable assets at (7): 
(1 *) * / ( ) (1 *)( * / ) X W W E XF X EF αα α α = +− = − +− +  
This expression is non-linear: its slope is a quadratic function of the real exchange rate 
E: 
                               2
*1
0,









as at (8). Hence (7) is downward sloping iff  * 1, αα +> but decreasingly so as E falls. 
The current account balance is given by equation (10), with slope given by the 
expression at (11) and  1 FF + = to ensure balance. This implies a current account 
balance relationship: 
                                          0 rF E z θ =++                                                     (17) 
where  1 [ (1 )(1 *)( )]/ r rXF E θα + = −+ −  is the state dependent coefficient implied by the 
underlying relation’s slope given at (11). Note that θ > 0 if X > F; but decreasingly so as 
F increases. So even if (17) looks like a linear approximation, it is in fact quite different. It 
provides a state dependent representation of the original equation; or, put differently, a 
piecewise sequence of linearisations that allows us to give a global representation of 
(10).                                                                    
Now, if we rearrange the terms in (7) and (17), we get the system: 









                                        (18) 




= −−                                                               (19)      
where the slope of (18) is given by (8); and the slope of (19) is negative given θ, itself a 
function of F now, and increasingly negative as F expands. Equations (18) and (19) can 
therefore be drawn in (E, F) space, as in Figure 6. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
 
  21 
Figure 6: Trade Space 
Source: Authors 
Figure 6 shows there are now two intersection points, corresponding to two equilibria: A 
and B. Following the results in section 3, it is obvious that only A is a dynamically stable 
equilibrium. It conforms to the local analysis of Figure 3. Point B, by contrast, is unstable 
and places the system on an explosive path. That follows from the analysis of Figure 4. 
In particular, to the right of B, a rise in net external debt F raises interest payments and 
contributes to an increase in the current account deficit. It also forces a decline of the 
real value of the home currency E, which improves the trade balance and thus 
contributes to a reduction in the current account deficit. To the right of B, the former 
effect prevails over the latter. The net effect on the current account would be an increase 
in the deficit, and a corresponding increase in  F. This process of exchange rate 
depreciations and increases in net debt will continue without limit. 
To the left of point B, the adjustments go the opposite way. A decrease in F contributes 
to an improvement in the current account deficit by reducing interest payments (recall 
Figure 2 showed the current account improves and net debt falls below the CA=0 line). 
That permits some deterioration in the trade deficit itself and a rise in the exchange rate. 
In other words, the net debt reduction now outweighs the currency effect, and we move 
off to the stable equilibrium at A.  
At A, the story is reversed: movements to the right of A improve the current account, 
movements to the left worsen it. In that sense, A represents the optimal debt position; 
and B the net debt limit—beyond which the domestic economy will collapse as debt 
escalates and the domestic currency collapses. Thus if A represents the optimal foreign 
debt level, AB is a measure of “trade space” (equivalent to the IMF’s concept of “fiscal 
space” in the management of public sector finances [Ghosh et al., 2011; Hughes Hallett ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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and Jensen 2011]). Policy, therefore, needs to be directed to keeping net foreign debt in 
the interval around A, where trade and portfolio balances are self-stabilizing, and away 
from point B where shocks, information errors, or policy mistakes could easily drive an 
economy into default (the unstable region beyond B) and cause a financial breakdown. 
There is one problem remaining: shifts in the relative positions of the current account 
and portfolio balances will change the position of the (stable and unstable) equilibrium 
points.  As the current account line moves down, and/or the portfolio balance line moves 
up, the two equilibrium points move together. Ultimately the lines may fail to intersect, in 
which case no equilibrium exists for either economy and the outcomes will become 
random and potentially explosive. This is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Shifting portfolio balances and the possibility that trade space vanishes 
Source: Authors 
If we consider the stable equilibrium point A1, an upward shift will move the equilibrium 
to A2, where the foreign debt F is higher and the real exchange rate is lower (more 
depreciated); further upward movement might bring the equilibrium to A3, where the 
portfolio balance curve is tangent to the current account line (stable for movements in 
one direction, but unstable in the other).  
This identifies a potential threat. If the trade space gets small, even a small departure in 
portfolio balances from A3 to the right, or current accounts to the left, will deny the 
system any possible equilibrium. Such cases would condemn our economies to a path of 
endless exchange rate depreciations and debt increases. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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To see the circumstances in which this might happen, eliminate E between (18) and 
(19), and solve the result for F: 
    
2 F [ (1 F (1 *] 0 r rX z zX X θ (1−α−α ∗ ) − −α ) − (1−α−α ∗ )] −[ −α ) + (1−α ∗ ) =       (20) 
It is easy to check if no equilibrium exists. Suppose we have the usual case where 
*1 αα +> . Using the conventional test for real roots, our companion paper
10
6.  POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
 shows that 
this will happen if, and only if, there are negative trade shocks (external; or as result of 
policy interventions, or an unfortunate escalation of costs) to the home economy of a 
certain size. The size of the danger zone depends on parameters from both partners 
(asset bases, home biases, rates of return, expected depreciations). So it requires action 
or policies from both sides to minimize the chances of a breakdown. 
We have used an established but often neglected  model of the current account 
balances, internationally held assets, and the interactions between them, to examine the 
stability of trade, currency markets and international portfolio balances. Using this model, 
we have established conditions for equilibrium in the foreign sector as a whole (trade 
and asset balances together); for whether those equilibria are stable or not; and for 
whether those equilibria are reachable if the financial markets are distorted by fixed 
exchange rates or capital controls.  
The most important conclusion is that foreign trade and asset markets will, in general, 
display multiple equilibria: at least two, one stable and one unstable. This gives rise to 
the idea of a “trade space” defining the areas in which it is safe to allow trade deficits 
and net foreign assets or debt to go; and areas which are not safe because, lacking an 
equilibrium position, debt burdens will explode and asset markets collapse. Thus, the 
first order of business is to ensure that a stable equilibrium exists. This cannot be 
guaranteed, but can be achieved (in the absence of certain negative trade shocks) if the 
portfolio balance line is steeper than the current account line at one of the equilibrium 
positions. This is entirely possible and necessary conditions were given in section 3.4.  
We can further strengthen that stability property by making portfolio balances more 
elastic (PB=0 steeper); that is, provide currency convertibility, free asset market access, 
asset substitutability, and greater competitiveness. The new feature, however, is that the 
ability to reach the relevant saddle path may depend on the relative speeds and timing of 
adjustments on the current and capital accounts. Modeling those differences in 
dynamics to determine the relevant critical values is a subject for further research. But 
they imply that trade imbalances could be inherently unstable, and put us at the bad 
equilibrium or beyond, even in the absence of shocks. 
The second order of business, if we are worried by the size of trade imbalances, net 
debt, or the possible collapse of certain asset markets, is to consider constraints such as 
capital controls or fixed exchange rates. But these are no more than temporary 
expedients; they cannot last without triggering bigger and more expensive adjustments 
later on, and may set in train adjustments that prevent a final equilibrium ever being 
reached. So there is a comparative advantage argument here: we should put in place 
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policies that increase the elasticity of trade adjustments and limit portfolio adjustments 
first. That of course is the opposite of the capital controls or fixed exchange rates. It says 
we should target safe net foreign debt or asset levels; and leave trade deficits free to 
adapt. This can be done within the “trade space” view we have emphasized. Indeed, if 
there is a case for fixed exchange rates, it is as a circuit breaker, set at E=Ē in figure 6 (a 
minimum exchange rate value, rather than a fixed value with symmetric deviations), 
designed to keep us away from the unstable equilibrium. ADBI Working Paper 330                                                            Hughes Hallett and Martinez Oliva 
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